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the aesthetics of experience, I am proposing that we integrate other histories occluded 
by the modernist visibility but deeply related to it. The movements of bodies, the irre-
pressible desire for markers of difference, the paths of pilgrimage are all components of 
proprioceptive systems that seem to be returning from the repressed. Are they replacing 
visibility or merely providing new images to circulate on ever more virtual forms of our 
networked optical world? Stay tuned.
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Worlds
In 1982 sociologist Howard Becker observed in Art Worlds that “all artistic work, like all 
human activity, involves the joint activity of a number, often a large number, of people.” 
His observation was in tune with the times: in the quarter century since, historians of art, 
historians, and sociologists alike have done much to elucidate “the complexity of the coop-
erative networks through which art happens.”1 Nonetheless, there are still many words that 
could be said about “worlds.” Indeed, once we begin to conceive of the American art world 
(or, more precisely, the American art world at any given moment in history) as an entity in 
its own right, we may analyze not only the subsets within that set but also the relationships 
between one art world and another. We may, for example, analyze large-scale transitions 
between different historical art worlds in the United States, or explore the almost limitless 
ways in which they overlapped, intersected with, or paralleled those of other places.
If the recognition that art worlds may be thought of as entities in their own right invites 
comparison between art worlds separated by time or by place, it also invites comparisons 
of another sort: between the historical art worlds of the United States and the future ones 
we might imagine. In other words, once we recognize that there are significant differences 
between various historical art worlds, we may begin to use our understanding of those 
differences as the basis for making normative judgments about them, and for using those 
judgments to help conceptualize what a “good” art world might look like.
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Art worlds, in addition to being subject to historical questions such as why certain insti-
tutional arrangements emerged, or why certain patterns of practice became dominant, can 
be subjected to value judgments. We can (and should) ask not just why things happened in 
an art world, or in the transition from one to another, but whether the things that happened 
were good. We can (and should) compare various institutional arrangements with others, 
both historical and imagined, and consider which were or might be better. And we can (and 
should) consider the question of what “better” actually means. Does a “good” or “better” art 
world mean one in which “good” or “better” art is made? That is, are aesthetic outcomes the 
most important? Or are political or ethical outcomes important too? Of course, as historians, 
critics, or sociologists of art, we often already make such considerations. But we usually do so 
within a context in which they are submerged under other concerns. 
Perhaps, then, we should think about worlds of art more philosophically and aim not 
only to analyze and describe them but also to imagine and devise them. For my part, I 
would propose that a good art world is one that provides for the greatest number of people 
to develop the greatest capability to exercise artistic creativity. I use philosopher and 
economist Amartya Sen’s term “capability” quite deliberately. Sen’s argument is about a 
much bigger set of issues than just art—it is about how to define, and how to secure, well-
being, advantage, and a good quality of life for all people. His position is that both “well-
being and advantage” can be approached “in terms of a person’s ability to do valuable acts 
or reach valuable states of being.” “Quality of life,” in other words, ought to “be assessed 
in terms of the capability to achieve valuable functionings.”2 It is not Sen’s aim to spell out 
a list of what such functionings are—indeed, one of the key elements of his approach is to 
admit that different people will develop different lists of valuable acts and states of being. 
At the same time, however, he does give some examples of the kinds of things people will 
put on such lists—including seemingly basic functionings having to do with health or 
nutrition (such as “freedom from malaria”) but also “creativity.” Sen’s close collaborator, 
Martha Nussbaum, is more explicit; among the capabilities she lists as necessary to a “good 
human life,” Nussbaum includes “being able to use the senses; being able to imagine, to 
think, and to reason—and to do these things in a way informed and cultivated by an ad-
equate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical 
and scientific training.”3
With Sen and Nussbaum in mind, then, I would suggest that the late-nineteenth-
century art world—particularly programs such as the 1870 Massachusetts Drawing Act 
that made the teaching of drawing a fundamental component of the universal, free educa-
tion of all people—compares favorably in at least some respects to more recent art worlds 
that lack institutional arrangements that facilitate universal artistic fluency or the exercise 
of imagination informed and cultivated by such fluency. A good art world is one that 
foregrounds human capabilities (most important, “being able to create”) and that works to 
cultivate those capabilities by providing the necessary education. As scholars of American 
art, we could do worse than to advocate on behalf of such a world.
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